The recent evolution of external payments in the United States and the United Kingdom has raised significant concerns and sparked a theoretical controversy. The gold exchange standard lies at the center of the debate, and proposals for reforming the international monetary system have multiplied. Setting aside the plans presented by independent economists such as Robert Triffin, it remains difficult to distinguish between doctrinal or scientific arguments and the defense of national or private interests.
From 1958 onward, a “dollar crisis” emerges as a result of the U.S. balance of payments deficit. For the industrialized countries of Western Europe, the shortage of dollars has become a thing of the past. In contrast, with steadily increasing gold and foreign exchange reserves, France has taken a leading role in criticizing the current international monetary system. It is not surprising that a country holding more than $5 billion in international liquidity seeks to free itself from dependence on key currencies by questioning their role in international payments. For this reason, the French position supports the primacy of gold—the “barbarous relic” described by John Maynard Keynes—which appears to retain potential relevance.
The contemporary controversy revolves around two essential issues: the U.S. deficit and its impact on international liquidity. Before examining reform proposals, it is necessary to analyze the characteristics of the dollar crisis.
The dollar crisis and the problem of international liquidity
France currently criticizes the United States for its external imbalance, illustrating how the nature of the dollar problem has shifted. The dollar and the pound sterling remain “key currencies,” used both as domestic and international means of payment. They serve not only for external transactions but also as reserves of international liquidity.
Countries issuing key currencies benefit from a structural advantage: they can finance external deficits using their own currency, which is widely accepted internationally. This acceptance reflects global confidence in a monetary instrument and cannot be overturned by the unilateral decision of a single country. Even if one government refused to accept dollars in settlement, this would not immediately eliminate their role as an international reserve. Only a coordinated rejection by all non-resident holders could produce such an outcome, a scenario far from current conditions.
However, the U.S. external deficit may ultimately undermine confidence among foreign holders of dollar-denominated assets. The growing imbalance is reflected in the fact that short-term external liabilities increasingly exceed total gold reserves. This raises questions about the sustainability of the system and whether the international role of the dollar is at risk.
Some analysts draw parallels with the crisis experienced by the United Kingdom in 1931, suggesting the possibility of a similar breakdown. While certain risks are evident, such interpretations often extend beyond the available evidence.
It is also important to note that the U.S. deficit has been offset by surpluses in Western Europe and Japan. This dynamic is reflected in the evolution of gold reserves: by the end of 1953, U.S. gold reserves amounted to $22.091 billion, compared to $9.164 billion for other industrialized countries. By December 1964, U.S. reserves had declined to $15.471 billion, while those of other industrialized nations had risen to $22.629 billion.
Since gold reserves represent only part of international liquidity, it is necessary to consider the evolution of foreign exchange reserves, most of which consist of dollar-denominated assets and therefore correspond to short-term external liabilities of the United States.