In terms of communication routes, England in the eighteenth century lagged behind certain European countries, among them France. The Duke of Bridgewater, who between 1759 and 1761 built the first canal—the Worsley Canal—had visited the Continent a few years earlier and was likely inspired by the works already undertaken in France. The construction of roads and canals was indispensable for the development of the population and trade. It was in the second half of the eighteenth century that England built its roads and canals.
The systematic reconstruction of roads was decided after the uprising of Charles Edward, defeated at Culloden in 1746. Public order was the main reason for developing a road network that would allow rapid movement of troops in any season. From 1760 to 1774, Parliament passed more than 450 “acts” concerning road maintenance and construction. The widely adopted system of toll roads (turnpike roads) encouraged private initiative. The first major builder was John Metcalf (1717–1810), followed by Telford (1757–1834) and Macadam (1756–1836). It should also be noted that the construction of new roads was facilitated by the redistribution of land stipulated in the enclosure acts, which made land available for roadways.
The use of waterways played an even more significant economic role than the improvement of bridges and roads. Water transport costs were lower than road transport. The first canals were built for the transport of coal for industrial and domestic purposes. The Duke of Bridgewater, who owned coal mines in Worsley, built a canal to transport coal to factories in Manchester. During the early decades of the eighteenth century, there was a genuine “canal fever,” largely driven by private initiative. As a result, transport costs dropped considerably, stimulating all forms of economic activity. Canal construction required massive investments, often financed through bank credit. Ultimately, however, overall economic development allowed investors to profit from their initiatives. By the end of the eighteenth century, 2,500 km of canals were in service; in 1835, 3,500 km; and by 1890, 4,000 km.
The construction of railway networks was another consequence of the Industrial Revolution, but it could not begin before the perfection of the steam engine. In 1830, there were fewer than 100 kilometers of railway in Great Britain. Railroads were not part of the “revolutionary” phase of England’s industrialization; however, the same would not be true for other European countries, Japan, and the United States, which, industrializing later, benefited directly from this new means of transport inherited from British development. In conclusion, the establishment of a communications network was a precondition for industrial development.
Demographic pressure
Although no general census existed before 1801, it is known that the British population, which had stagnated and sometimes declined during the first four decades of the eighteenth century, began to grow rapidly around 1750. Between 1771 and 1831, the population of England and Wales doubled. The population of Great Britain quadrupled between 1800 and 1914, rising from 10 million to more than 40 million inhabitants.
The decennial growth rate was about 7% between 1750 and 1770. After a slight reduction between 1771 and 1781, it rose to 9% in the period 1781–1791 and to 16.9% in the period 1811–1821. Demographic pressure was thus significant during the Industrial Revolution, though growth rates declined gradually into the early nineteenth century. Two difficult questions arise:
- What were the causes of population growth?
- Was demographic pressure a cause, a consequence, or both, of economic development?
The causes of population growth
The causes of English population growth from the 1750s remain debated. Recent studies suggest that the decline in mortality and the role of medical progress may have been overestimated, at least for the period 1750–1800. Jenner’s smallpox vaccine was not introduced until 1796, and the effects of medical progress were not strongly felt until the early decades of the nineteenth century.
The demographic growth beginning in the mid-eighteenth century resulted from a double movement: a reduction in mortality rates and an increase in birth rates. If medical explanations must be set aside, economic factors provide a more convincing explanation, once the magnitude of rate variations is established.
The following data summarize the evolution of birth and mortality rates between 1700 and 1830. It shows general trends but not temporary fluctuations caused, for instance, by the Napoleonic Wars. Mortality began to decline from 1750 but only fell below 30% after 1780, with a spectacular drop to 22% occurring between 1820 and 1830.
During the same period, the birth rate rose from 33.9% before 1750 to 37.5% between 1780 and 1800. This dual evolution, whose overall trend is unquestionable, was one of the consequences of the economic transformations of the time.
Higher fertility, earlier marriages, and illegitimate births accompanied urban development and factory life. However, birth and mortality rates were clearly influenced by the “agricultural revolution” even before industrialization. The increase in food production in late seventeenth-century England both favored higher birth rates and reduced mortality. Falling mortality was primarily a result of more abundant food rather than advances in medicine or hygiene.
Several authors have recently highlighted the influence of economic factors on demographic trends in non-industrialized societies. Under the influence of wars, epidemics, and famines, mortality fluctuated more than natality. These catastrophic events increased mortality and reduced births. Conversely, good harvests and peace stimulated higher births and lower mortality. Thus, demographic growth depended directly or indirectly on the economic situation of the country.
Ireland confirms this thesis: between 1760 and 1840, the Irish population doubled, growing as rapidly as Great Britain’s (see Table III). The expansion of potato cultivation, the staple food of the poor, was a major cause of this demographic growth. The crop failures of 1845–1846 caused famine in Ireland, after which the population began to decline. The weakness of the Irish economy and emigration to the United Kingdom explain this trend. Demographic pressure alone was not sufficient to trigger industrialization. More mouths to feed could not increase production without adequate techniques and resources. In such conditions, and in the absence of vaccines and antibiotics, surplus population was automatically reduced. Later, medical progress removed this “stabilizing mechanism,” producing the “demographic explosion” observed in today’s developing countries.
Demographic pressure as a development factor
Economic mechanisms rarely have universal applicability. What holds true in one context may not in another. Before the Industrial Revolution, demographic pressure was merely a dependent variable; it later became a driving force integrated into the structures of modern society. Once technical advances allowed production to grow steadily, population growth generated new needs and thus new markets for producers. Population growth became an essential factor of progress, as Alfred Sauvy demonstrated in his Théorie générale de la population.
While the population of Great Britain quadrupled between 1800 and 1914, France’s population grew by only one third. Sauvy attributes France’s economic lag—visible until after the Second World War—to this lack of demographic pressure. Without demographic pressure, there is no essential factor driving demand growth, and industrial expansion may remain paralyzed or slowed. The supply of labor depends on population, particularly in an era when child labor was widespread. Between birth and the beginning of factory work, only a few years elapsed. Once industrialization began and the “take-off” stage was reached, reciprocal interaction arose between demographic pressure and economic development.